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Our primary objective in preparing this paper is to investigate and
expose a number of fundamental causes underlying the actual failures of
several recent efforts in consumer protection. We strongly believe that
unless these root problems are eliminated or minimized there is very
little hope that consumers in the market place can be sufficiently or
effectively protected from a number of threats to rational and safe buyer
behavior and consumption behavior. Indeed, we clearly see the presence
of a "catch - 22" phenomenon in the present state of consumerism efforts.
In this paper, we first review the areas of consumerism, the entities
involved and interested in consumer protection, and a typology of consumerism.
Second, we examine in some detail how each entity entrusted with the task of
consumer protection is likely to fail. Finally, we present some long-
term strategies which s^em. to provide greater payoffs in consumer protection.
Review of Consumerism
Not surprisingly but unfortunately, consumerism means different
things to different groups and entities. For example, to the new militant
activists in the area, it is simply caveat venditor or let the seller beware.
On the other hand, to the business entity, it has meant, at least in some
quarters, a threat to free enterprise and capitalism. Peter Drucker (19&9)
has defined it as follows: "Consumerism means that the consumer looks upon
the manufacturer as somebody who is interested but who really does not know
what the consumer's realities are. He regards the manufacturer as somebody
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vrho has nob made the effort to find out, who does not understand the
world in which the consumer lives, and who expects the consumer to be
able to make distinctions which the consumer is neither willing nor able
to make" (p. 2). Accordingly, if we consider marketing as the process
of identifying and satisfying customer needs, wants and dssire for a
profit, consumerism can exist only if the marketing concepts have either
not worked cr more probably not fully utilised by management. The industry
has- therefore, often considered modern marketing practice as an alternative
tr consumerism rjovement (Christopherson 19<7-}» Finally, according to the
Consu/ner Advisory Council (1963), consumerism has meant the provision
and. enforcement of a bill of rights of consumers consisting of the right
to safety, the right to be informed, the right to choose, and the right
to be heard.
Despite the differences of opinions among various groups and entities,
consumerism is generally considered to include some form of protection to
people against (a) physical threat to life, health and property; (b)
economic threat to rational and satisfying consumption benefit as a result
of market imperfections, abuses, fraud and deception; and (c) threat from
other consumers in the process of collective consumption in the modern
technological mass consumption society (Aaker and Day, 1971; Gaedeke and
Etcheson 1972) • Similarly, most researchers and practitioners in
consumerism believe that there are three distinct processes with identifiable
entities which should safeguard consumer interest (Uhl 1971) They are
(a) the government tkrough the process of legislation and regulation;
(b) the business through the process of free competition and industry wide
self regulation, and (c) the consumer activists through the process of
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place. The following diagram, adapted from J. N. Uhl (1971) pretty much
summarizes thcne three entities and process:
Regulation
.
-^Consumer Education «$ ^
and
Consumer Consciousness?
I
Consumer Protection
Competition
&
Self Regulation
sy
TK*re is, however, virtually no agreement among practitioners of
consumerism as to which process or the entity is more desirable from a
realistic welfare of protecting consumer interests. If anything, partisan
lines have been sc strongly etched that we feo,~ it often leads to
"negative sura" game playing among the three entities* Furthermore, it is
often forgotten that the three processes interact and influence one another
.1 their effoi to provide consumer protection. For example, greater
consumer educ •*. and consciousness often leads to better legislation
and regulation a:-; well a? greater self regulation. Similarly
,
greater
regulation is likely to generate more self regulation and competition.
Finally, intense competition often produces additional legislation and
regulation.
We define consumerism as the organized efforts by or for consumers
to maintain or enhance consumption welfare in a mass consumption technological
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society. Tacitly, we think that consumerism an a concept or ideology
is less relevant to agrarian and other less developed economies.
Accordingly, the three types of threats from which consumers need protection
are presumed to be largely a function of mass production and mass
consumption possible in an industrial state,
Based on our extensive review of consumer protection literature,
we have developed the following typology of consumerism issues.
a. Physical Safety and Hazards of Mass Consumption
Physical safety is probably the most cbvicus and highly releva
area of consumer protection. As stated above physical safety is presumed
to be largely a phenomenon and consequence cf high technology. We believe
that safety consequences of man-made technology are least known to us
and, therefore, represent a much greater threat to human life than the
natural hazards. For example, we know very little about the conseqrences
of consuming preservatives and other chemicals in our food consumption.
We can also divide the physical safety typology into two further types:
(1) safety in voluntary consumption of products and services such g.s
consumer durables, nondurables and voluntary services and (2) safety in
involuntary consumption of the polluted environment. The latter includes
collective consumption of polluted natural resources essential to human
survival such as water and air. Most of the involuntary consumption
activities often to be collective and, therefore, possess the inherent
danger of mass effects of photochemical smog in highly industrialized
metropolitan cities such as Tokyo or Los Angeles.
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D# Economic Rationality
This type of consumer protection area refers to economic loss,
sacrifice and disutility which the consumer often encounters in the
market place. It is further stratified into four distinct categories:
(1) protection against what Senator Magnuson call** the dark side of the
market place (Magnuson and Carper 1968). This include.'; fraud, deception
and intentional misrepresentation as well as coercive and high pressure
persuasive tactics of marketers such as "bait and switch advertising,
chain-referral selling, free ginmicks and fear-sell; (2) right to choose
which includes concern related to monopoly powers, price collusions
among oligopolists and other activities which are presumed to inhibit
competition; (3) right to be informed. Thia not only concerns questions
of unfounded claims, exaggerations and misrepresentations about the
product attributes but also includes questions of parti el and incomplete
information and full disclosure; ana (4) rif;ht to be hesrd which is
primarily concerned with the question of consumer redress.
e. Environmental Imb alance and Threats to Jjiumairl. L,y
This type of cow >rism is best described as "she macro long-term
effects of mass consumption. We can divide tether into three
subcategories; (1) excessive resource depletion and exploitation. In
their industrial c: . .-. mulattos of demand and supply of worlcl
resources ? meadows, et. sJ ( ...;?l) suggest limits to growth are
finite amd much sooner thi hat is realized due tc heavy depletion of
natural resources such as ratals, energy and chemicals; (2) pollution of
the environment in the process of mass consumption. Solid waste, air
pollution and water pollution are major aspects of this category including
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the economics of recycling; (3) standardization of the human specie.
Major concern has been recently raised abou-;. the homogeneity of human
biology due to mass consumption of identical nutrients, chemicals and
other life support entities and the lack cf immunization such standardization
is likely to generate. While very little known and researched in this
area, concern is aroused by the recent experiences of standardized
agricultural crops.
&• Social Safety and Social Inequities
In contrast to the physical safety considerations in personal
consumption of products and services, ve now discuss the psychological
and physical safety considerations in ma; 3 consumption societies. It
is argued that we live in an "other-directed society" where the social
pressures of conspicuous consumption and conspicuous nonconsumpticn are
equally critical to examine, under this typology, we distinguish five
categories of concern in consumerism: (1) safety and protection from other
consumers. This includes the effects of smoking; on nonsmokers, discarding
cf harmful and potentially dangerous containers, and the like; (2) problem
of low income families who cannot meet the societal expectations of
minimum mass consumption behavior; (3) safeguard of minority interests
from being exploited by marketers of products and services, for example,
the recent mass efforts to segiaent the black segment in numerous industries;
ih) negative side effects of mass communication and consumption such as
the effects of television programming on children, ami the lack of
exercise and effort due to very affluent consumption of convenience goods
and services: and (5) dehumanization in ma&s consumption society such as
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lack of concern interest or even shock In witnessing crimes, poverty and
wars.
As can be seen from the above typology, the issues of consumerism
are diverse and far-reaching. Some of them are more immediate, for
example, physical safety considerations, and others are far-removed
from daily immediate activities of consumers such as dehumanixation and
standardization of the specie. Some of the issues are pragmatic and other.:
are ideological and, therefore, more abstract.
Let us now examine the role of each of the three entities and their
processes in protecting consumer interests. Since our view is rather
pessimistic about the potential of providing consumer protection, we
will be limiting our arguments to the problem areas inherent in each
process. Also, the evidence on recent efforts is negative to warrant our
concentration on problems rather than the promises in each process.
The Pole of the Legislative -Regulatory Process
Perhaps the single most commonly recommended process to solve
consumer problems is government legislation and regulation (Barber 1966).
"*ased on our review of a number of books and articles, we find that the
following major weaknesses and limitations make government legislation
or regulation ineffective in solving problems of consumerism.
1. Lack of technical know-how. It is no exaggeration when we state
that regulatory agencies know very little about the market realities
they are asked to regulate and certainly they know much less than
the regulated Industry managers. (Withrow, 196?; Cohen, 1969)
While there are a number of explanations possible for this ironic
reality, the mosc interesting to us is the singular lack of interest
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among professionals for the civil service. Except only in very-
recent years, va find that the best graduating students in any
applied discipline have consistently shunned the government
employment opportunity.
Second , it also seems that a number of technological
advancements have been transformed into product realities without
fully ccroprehending all of their manifest or latent hazards. For
example, very few including the regulatory agencies know the
physical effects of cyclamates, hexachlorophine , enzymes and the
like let alone their more subtle psychological effects on consumers.
2. Starvation budgets of the regulatory agencies. Ralph Nader
(I968) dramatically points out this limitation by some statistics:
the ccrrhined annual budget of the FTC and the Antitrust Division
of the Justice Department in 1968 was $23 million with which they
were supposed to collect data, initiate investigations, and enforce
the law:, dealing with deceptive and anticompetitive practices of
a $350 billion economy. If we examine the annual budget of FTC
alone, it is at least forty times less than the annual advertising
and promotion budget of Proctor & Gamble. The starvation budgets
make the regulatory agencies virtually ineffective in their efforts
.0 detect and legally support any evidence pointing toward deception,
misrepresentati* 1 or fraud. Thus, even if the regulatory agencies
were technically competent, they don't have the means to enforce
lavs.
3* Lack of uniformity in enforcement. Surprisingly, the process
of enforcement, even in the limited number of cases where it exist**.

-9-
is haphazard and almost random. Most enforcement activities are
initiated by complaints from competitors or from the direct letters
of the consumers . (ABA Commission Report, 1969), In other words, the
regulatory agencies have been practicing on the principle of management
by exception rather than on the principle of management by objectives*
k» Enforcement limited to trivia. A stronger indictment of the
regulatory agencies has been their singular efforts to limit enforcement
to trivial aspects. For example, according to the ABA Commission
Report (1969) > the FTC has simultaneously ignored some fundamental
aspects such as ghetto frauds, monitoring advertising practices and
securing effective compliance with orders, and at the same time has
concentrated on the failure to disclose that "Navy Shoes" were not
made by the Navy, that flies were imported, that Indian trinklets
were not manufactured by American Indians, and that Havana cigars
were not made entirely of Cuban tobacco. Comparable case histories
of regaling in trivia prevalent in other agencies such as the
Antitrust Division and PDA can be found in Withrow (19b?) and
Dunkelberger (1969),
5. Antiquated organizational structures, Even in the enforcement
of trivia on a haphazard basis with limited funds and technical
competence, we find that bureaucracy par excellence often has
mitigated its impact. There are simply too many agencies in too
many places to deal with a single problem. For example, as of
I969, there were 269 consumer progra-as administered by 33 different
Federal Agencies (Congressional Quarterly- ia£c* r^Mj^u* ^~''

-10-
The problem is even worse at the state and local levels where often
the doctrine of political patronage tends to dominate in any enforcement
activity,
6. Lack of realistic theory of buyer behavior. Perhaps the single
most critical problem in both legislative and enforcement activities
is lack of theory of buyer behavior. Unfortunately, many of the laws
enacted to protect the consumer are based on value Judgements, partial
knowledge of the realities of consumer behavior, or worse yet on
classical economic concepts of utility which no longer prevail in
the market place. Withrow (196?) very clearly points out this problem
as it relates to the antitrust policy. Another example is the recent
proposal to enact unit pricing laws in grocery stores based on the
presumption that (a) the housewife is neither aware nor capable of
calculating unit prices and (b) unit price information can at best
have positive effect on rational choice and at worst no effect. Just
as the marketing practitioner has chosen to ignore negative impacts
of advertising, so also it seems that proponents of unit pricing
have chosen to ignore negative consequences such as overstocking
and everconsumption of unit pricing
-
The problem created by lack of a theory of buyer behavior is
further compounded when existing laws are interpreted and enforced
by regulatory agencies. McGhe 65) ha?? lemonsir&ted this in the
enforcement of Robinson-Patman Act, Bunxelterger (I969) finds this
problem inherent in the enforcement of truth in packaging laws, and
Cohen {1969) pleads for more behavioral theories in the FTC thinking.
Indeed, the recent case of the boomerang effect of "corrective
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advertising" concept in bresd industry is direct testimonial to the
lack of theory of buyer behavior in Federal enforcement: activities*
7. The economic might of the industry* Some have bitterly complained
against the strong lobby efforts which the industry can, and oiten
does, resort to block passage of certain laws such as truth-in-
packaging and truth- in- lending bills. The economic might of the
industry is felt even greater because of a direct contrast in thn
lobbying efforts of the consumer advocates (Mader 1968)* A second,
and only indirectly related aspect of the economic might vested in
the industry is the systematic hiring of regulatory agency officials
once they resign or retire from their duties* It is alleged that often
the regulatory officials remain soft hearted due to the future economic
windfall they expect: from such employments.
It should be evident from the above discussion that the prospects
of consumer projection by the process of government regulation
intervention and legislation are rather small.
The Role of Competiti on and the Free-enterprise Process
Although we are not as pessimistic about the role of competition and
the free enterprise process of the business world as that of the regulatory-
legislative process, we oaust express our concern about a number of matters
which seem to inhibit this, process from providing consumer protection*
1, Lack of customer-oriented marketing. Perhaps the single most
critical reason why business may fail to play "positive sum" game
with the consumers and, therefore, fail to safeguard consumer
interests is the lack of customer-oriented marketing. Unfortunately,
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makers which lends them to rayopic&lly focus on products instead
of customer needs, to believe marketing is selling, and to define
corporate oblective as profits f:rom sales instead of profits from
satisfied customers (Kotler 1968), To this end, Drucker 1969
flatly explains presence of consumerism as the shame of the total
marketing concept:,. It can also be shown that product-oriented
marketing practice leading to innovate-or-perish policy is not
o*i!y incapable ol providing consumer protection, but it may be
the heart of out current problems in multinational marketing
(Sbeth 1972).
Fortunately, there seem to be enough unpleasant experiences
from ianovate-or-perish policy to encourage management to plan
business activities by working backwards from the needs of the
;toraers in the market place* To chis extent, we think there
ifl at least some hope that problems of consumerism may be mitigated
by customer-oriented marketing concept (Christopherson 19/2).
Z, Problems in self-regulation of industry. The most common
alternative suggested to prevent and cure the ills of marketing
-.ilpractices by & minority of business firms is the concept of
self-regulation. Unfortunately, the track record of self-
regulation as a potential alternative to protect consumer
interests is not too good* Overwhelmingly, we find empirical
evidence and thinking of both scholars and practitioners which
suggest that eel f-regulation is unlikely to solve problems of
consumer protection because it is not a workable proposition
(Boyd and Olaycamp 1966; Stern 1971; Levin 1967; Van Gise 1966;
Turner 1967)* A number of reasons have been cited for the art»«*1
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and potential failure of self regulation to protect consumer
interests. The first and foremost is the fear, and sometimes
the actual reality, that any collective activity such as self-
regulation may be in violation of the Sherman Act or some other
antitrust legislation. This fear often leads to some members of
an industry to give up on any self-regulatory activities by
resigning to the view that "you will be damned if you don*t but
doubly damned if you do." In shorty the fear of legal complications
and problems often short circuits any initiative or desire toward
self regulation. We consider this as another example of "catch-
22" phenomenon in the realm of consumer protection,
A second common reason for the failure of self-regulation is
that there are too many parties involved each with differences
in goals and perceptions. Accordingly, it is inevitable that
group conflict will be present and persistent which often entails
its inefficient resolution by the process of bargaining and
politiking (March and Simon 1958 j Sheth 1972).
Finally, it is very difficult, and sometimes impossible, to
provide adequate internal safeguards, monitoring and policing
against some self-serving members of industry. In this regard,
we fear a parallel between the governmental regulatory agencies
and the industry in regard to unenforceability of rules and
procedures.
3. Lack of interest end commitment. A third major factor which
is likely to limit the role of business entity to provide consumer
protection is the total commitment to achieving day-to-day profit
maximization (Levitt 1968) It see^g that ev»« ;:**~ ^n-**
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management suffers from lack of time to envision lor;g term consequences
of myopic thinking and business practices, Consequently there
appears to be lack of a sense of social responsibility partly
encouraged by the pressures of competition, This is further
compounded by a strong belief that the doctrines of caveat emptor
and free enterprise should and do provide enough incentives and
safeguards to minimize consumer problems,, In fact, it Is relatively
easy to trace the cause of typical cefeneive reactions of the industry
to any legislative, advocacy or regulatory challenges of business
practice to these beliefs.
The Role of the Consumer Advocate?
We think the role of the consumer advocates to solve consumer problems
is even more limited than cither the government or the business entity. This
may seem paradoxical at first blush but there is enough evidence a»d reasoning
to support our position* What are the underlying factors which minimize
the potential of consumer advocates to solve consumer problems?
The first and the most serious factor relates to at total lask of consumer's
own viewpoint on the matter. Heat consumer advocates thrive on normative models
of ideal consumers and consider themselves as evangelists in pointing out what
is good tor the consumer. Often such normative models are far removed from
the reallti&s of csvev •; vior to be very useful, A case in point is the
recent efforts to iegisic^e uni£ prici,
.
thout any systematic research or
experimentation on the psychology of buyers and Ou their information processing
decision rules in the supermarket situation. A related r.>cior is the typical
oversight of any negati"*i consequences that may ensue from a proposed
legislative or regulatory change because most of such proposals are bas*»d
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on the normative thinking that such changes will only be for the good of the
consumer. In other words, often only one side of the coin is typically
examined and researched by the consumer advocates.
A second factor detrimental to efforts of consumer advocates in consumer
protection i3 that they tend to be issue-oriented rather than problem-oriented,
There is often a complete lack of conceptualizing the totality of a consumer
problem area. The efforts, therefore, often resemble the proverbial blind
men and the elephant. Consequently, most efforts and even any research on
specific problem areas tend to be symptomatic instead of explanatory and
causal. We strongly believe that the myopic issue-oriented viewpoint simply
generates more unnecessary and irrelevant controversies and debates as to
how to solve the problem rather than providing its actual solution. Once
again, therefore, we can*t resist but imply a ,,catch-22M phenomenon in the
efforts of the consumer advocates,,
The third factor which delimits the role of consumer advocates relates
to presence of starvation budgets for research and lobbying efforts and
absence of professional credibility in most of their fundamental research on
product testing procedures, (Thoreili 1971). In addition, whatever labeling
and testing information is diffused to consumers, it tends to be so complex
and technical to be of little inter* -s? to consumerSc Related to the problem
of credibility, we find that problems of consumerism are often handled in an
emotional manner rather than in a rational roanner. While there is nothing
wrong in emotional reasoning and expression cf the dire need for consumer
protection, it often leads to a general disbelief among interested parties
especially the industry.
Finally, there is the tragedy of the realities of consumer education and
information; Those consumers who need the information most are the least
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The classic example of this tragedy is the fact that the Consumer Reports
is primarily read by college educated professional people and not by the
ghetto consumers; the latter probably need that type of information most
and, as we understand, Consumer Reports was primarily published for them
in its humble beginning. We think this tragedy is not because less educated
consumers are irrational decision makers but because the consume.* advocates
have grossly failed to incorporate the customer-oriented approach tr> their
marketing efforts of providing consumer education arid information,
V/hat About the Team Effort?
•**—MM^MCM*
Often the suggestion is made that what we need is a joint cooperative
effort among all the three entities and processes to minimize or even
eradicate consumer problems.
Our viewpoint on the possibility and success of team effort is also
pessimistic. In regard to the cooperative efforts between the government
and the industry, our pessimism is simply an echo of an elegant analysis by
Bauer and Greyser in what they call "the dialogue that never happens"*
What are some of the reasons for this prevalent pessimistic attitude among
number of scholars and researchers?
First, it is argued that there are some fundamental differences
between the regulatory agencies and the Industry in their models of buyer
behavior , Each one is looking into the world of consumer behavior with
different pairs of glassed. At the n*»rr of this difference Is the prevalence
of a normative model (How should consumers behave) among the regulatory agencies
and & descriptive model (How do consumers behave) eraong the marketing practitioners
Furthermore, the structure of the two models and reliance on specific disciplines
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presuoie greater importance of price and promotion in manipulating consumers
while the industry typically relies on product innovation and distribution
as more important adaptive mechanisms to meet changing needs of the consumers.
Similarly, the regulatory agencies often examine the market performance in
terms of aggregate market behavior but the industry invariably look& at
market performance in terms of market segments.
A second major factor which has limited the team effort is the blind
defensive atcitudes and reactions of the industry to any governmental
legislation or regulation. Business W>** (l%9) describes this defensive
reaction neatly as consisting c the following sequential stage* of reactions
to any proposed legislation: (X) Deny everything, (2) Ble-e wrongdoing on
the small marginal companies in the industry, (3) Discredit the critics,
(4) fl-fre *> p.^iic relations man, (5) Darang the legislation, (6) Launch
a feet- finding committee or a^en a research institute, and (7) Actually
do something about: che consumer problems.
Unfortunately, the defensive attitudes anu reactions are widespread so
as tc qualify as a mass ph tenon* We <>hlnk they have arisen due to two
causal falters. First, lack of modern-day realities of market structure and
consumer behavior in the professional education in economics ana business.
Por example, we still get educated in the principles of classical theory
of: the firm arid perfect rmpetition despite the fact that it is so rarely
present in today's maincet structure arid competitive behavior to be almost
mythical. Second, thft rrst experience and "crack record" at legislating
and regulating the fre-a flay of n&rk&t behavior is dismal to say the least
(Barber 1966, Vithrow 1967).
A third factor which limits the role of team effort in protecting
consumer! arises front the fact that both suffer from the same limitation©
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of myopic views of eonsutaers, of organizational bureaucracy, and of
technical ignorance to assess the effects of technology. Thus, rather
than pulling together each others strengths, the team effort often results
in the examination of each other*s weaknesses. Furthermore, the fat is
added to the fire by a basic mistrust and differences in values among
professionals in the regulatory agencies and the industry.
Are There Any Solutions?
If the reader by now feels that the paper is a strong indictment of
all the entities and processes engaged in consumer protection, we have
fulfilled one of out objectives. For sure, we might have either ignored
or minimized the positive efforts of some of the entities and processes;
however, our review of the literature reveals more fervors and failures
rather than favorable actions and results.
The reader may have also felt that the paper is e reflection of pessimism
of the authors. This feeling is partly a true reflection of pessimism and
partly our, deep-seated belief that fundamental long-term changes are
mandatory if we are to succeed in providing appropriate protection to
consumer welfare. What are seme of these fundamental changes?
The first recommendation is to adopt a strategy of selectivity and
segmentation among the three entities and their processes (See Sheth 1972b
for some general segmentation prepositions) • The problem of consumerism is
complex, multidimensional and diverse as can be judged from the typology
of areas of consumer protection. No single entity can, therefore, fully
tackle the totality of consumerism especially when each entity seems to
suffer from economic and expertise resources. We, therefore, recommend
that the total problem area of consumer protection should be segmented and
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Below is a grid of problem-entity Interaction wliich capitalizes on the potential
strengths of each entity and its process.
physical Safety
Economic Rationality
Social Safety and Inequities
Environmental Imbalance
Consumer Consumer
Government Industry Advocates K!>;3eli:
-i
L
i
»>
i
3
In the above grid, we think it is best to notivate the Uduatry to
provide physical safety in consumption, to encourage the consumer himself
to become more rational buyer, ti rechannel the energies of the consumer
advocates toward problems of soc.t.l saiety and social inequities, and to
mandate the government to forestall environmental balance.
A second recommendation is i nation.il effort tc nitiate a crash program
to understand the complexity and realities of consumer behavior* Despite
living in an inius trial state and mass consumption society, we know very little
from a policy viewpoint about the buyer behavior of citizens. What we need
is a national research council endorsed and financed by both the government
and the industry which will engage In compilation and analysis of data
pertaining to consumption behavior *t a psychological and microlevel.
Furthermore , it <?houlc\ have a rational recognition and status comparable to
SSF ami OT.
From this rssearch e::::ort, ws expect the emergence of realistic
comprehensive theories of Uyv.r bahmr&t-r vhich should then guide the thinking
and policy decision o; all tha entitle*! anyafced in consumer protection, Such
comprehensive theories of buyer behavior should prove useful as a vista of
consumer behavior, an a common iramc of reference *nd vocabulary among all
the entities, and as a guide to fundamental research la confer behavior*
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Fortunately, there is a good deal of hope r.hat such an endeavor is realistic
and feasible as we b^gin to examine the future of buyer behavior theory
(Sheth 1972c),
A third recommendation relates to introducing some fundamental changes
in our professional training and education at ths higher education level*
Unfortunately, most schools either explicitly or implicitly seem to encourage
the attitude that business ends just any means. Somehow, there is too great
an emphasis en winning the g&me and little emphasis on the sportsmanship in
our professional education and training. Xa^se attitudes are further
reinforced oy a basic job insecurity *- nd r.he toward system based on competitive
aggressive behavior. The nat result is the common occurrence of a professional
individual in a big company stooping to the deceptive and sometimes fraudulent
activities s, for the bake of the corporation 1 ' uft.jite the consistent pax<&at:a)
guidance and insistence on a religious foil of the t*».n commandments.
We hope that both the corporate entity and the professional individuals working
in the corporation temper the spirit of competition with business ethics
and pergonal values.
The last recommendation in most radical *nd probably very difficult t«
implement. V?e strongly believe that both the child rearing practices and
secondary school education provide little competence tn the new generation
cope with the realities of a complex mass consecution society. It is
often surprising to reflect on the very little change in those educational
processes both in content anH format and contrast it to the enormous and
rapid changes in the socicc d tic base of our society, We» therefore,
recommend mass education of children and young adults especially in the
public school systems to develop in them awareness and competence of the
following aspects of realities oi mass consumption:
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a. Pirov Ide formal knowledge about tlae criteria with which to evaluate
cowpl technical products and servicer and to choose more rationally,
b. Develop managerial and decision-makiig skills in them as consumers
comparable to the same type of skills we inculcate In people to become
professionals in industry or government.
c. Increase consumer's knowledge of the workings «.: business*
government and the; narket place.
d. Develop values ard consciousness witch will invigorate respect and
concern for other consumers in their pursuit of collective consumption*
We think it will be highly desirable, and even mandatory in the not too
distant future, to replace pure and abstract subjects such as mathematics,
physics, chemistry, languages and the tike with more applied courses in
managerial consumer behavior, market analysis, business organization and
applied technology. KJnlesn there is a major change in our present mass
consumption habits, hopafully brought about by the above revisions in mass
education, we think the negative side eflects of mass consumption may
endanger our very existence.
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